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Abstract: Ray-finned fish are often excluded from the group of non-human animals
considered to have phenomenal consciousness. This is generally done on the grounds that the
fish pallium lacks a sufficiently expansive gross parcellation, as well as even minimally
sufficient neuronal organization, intrinsic connectivity, and reciprocal extrinsic connections
with the thalamus to support the subjective experience of qualia. It is also argued that fish do
not exhibit the level of behavioral flexibility indicative of consciousness. A review of
neuroanatomical, neurophysiological and behavioral studies is presented which leads to the
conclusion that fish do have neurobiological correlates and behavioral flexibility of sufficient
complexity to support the hypothesis that they are capable of phenomenal consciousness.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Two connected theses will be defended in this paper. The first thesis is that ray-finned
fishes of the teleost subclass (Actinopterygii; hereafter referred to simply as fishes)1 are
sentient. The second thesis is that the pallium contributes to sentience in these species. Allen
and Trestman (2016) equate phenomenal consciousness and sentience. I will adapt their use
of the term and define sentience2 as at least the minimal capacity to have subjective
experience of the qualities associated with external and internal sensations, as well as
affective and motivational states. The consequence of this capacity is that there is something
that it “feels like” to be the individual, human or animal, that has subjective experience (Nagel
1974).
I argue that there is something it feels like to be a fish. Others disagree, and usually
ground their disagreement on two general arguments. The first argument is that fishes lack
the neuroanatomical substrates necessary for consciousness. This argument assumes that a
layered neocortex, or a structure homologous to it, with a number of anatomically distinct
divisions and reciprocal anatomical connections among them, is required for even minimal
sentience. Furthermore, massive reciprocal connections between the neocortex and the
thalamus are needed. Because the fish pallium is not homologous to the mammalian
neocortex, and its reciprocal connections with the thalamus are sparse, fishes lack the
required neuroanatomical substrates for sentience (Cabanac et al. 2009; D. Edelman et al.
2005; Key 2015, 2016a; Rose 2002, 2007; Rose et al. 2012; Seth et al. 2005). The second
argument follows naturally from the first. It is that fishes do not exhibit behaviors that require
sentience. On this view, all of the behaviors observed in fishes, regardless of how complex
they appear to be, are explicable by reference to simple sensory–motor reflexes, speciestypical behaviors, or procedural/implicit learning and memory. I contend that both of these
arguments fail.
In this target article I will present research supporting the hypothesis that the fish
brain is neuroanatomically complex enough to support sentience. I will also present evidence
that the pallium of the fish has neurophysiological activity similar to correlates of sentience
in mammals. Finally, I will provide selected examples of behaviors generally thought to
require sentience in humans.
2. SENTIENCE IN FISHES: THE OPTIC TECTUM
Several theories propose that sentience emerged in animals when the hindbrain,
midbrain and diencephalic nuclei first evolved (e.g., Damasio 2010; Feinberg and Mallatt
2013, 2016; Merker 2007; Panksepp 2005). These theories differ in neuroanatomical detail
and in the physiological and behavioral processes they emphasize. They will not be reviewed
here (see Feinberg and Mallatt 2016, chapter 7, for a discussion). However, they have the
following in common: (i) proposing that at least minimal sentience is possible without a
neocortex, and (ii) attributing a role in the generation of sentience to the optic tectum.
Cartilaginous fishes, such as sharks and rays, from the class chondrichtyans are not included in this
discussion.
2 What I am calling sentience is, in general, the same process that Feinberg and Mallatt (2016) call sensory
consciousness and that G. Edelman (1989) refers to as primary consciousness.
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Figure 1. The drawings in this figure are provided as aids in visualizing the physical

relationships among the major divisions of the fish brain discussed in the text. They are
generalized representations and may therefore deviate in detail from the specific
descriptions given in the cited references. (A) Schematic of a longitudinal (sagittal) section of
the fish brain. The drawing represents a parasagittal section from the location of the dashed
line in (B). That is, it comes from a location slightly away from the midline of the brain.
Abbreviations: Cb – cerebellum; Ha – habenula; Hy – hypothalamus; OB – olfactory bulb; OT
– optic tectum; Th – thalamus; P – pituitary; PgC – preglomerular complex. (B) A schematic
cross section from the dorsal through the ventral surface of one hemisphere of the fish
telencephalon. The section is drawn to represent the approximate anterior-posterior level of
the brain demarcated by the vertical line in (A). It shows the locations of the pallial divisions
given by Nieuwenhuys and Meek (1990). Abbreviations (all beginning with D refer to
divisions of the pallium): DD – dorsodorsal; DMd – dorsomedial dorsalis; DLv – dorsomedial
ventralis; DLd – dorsolateral dorsalis; DC – dorsalis centralis; DP – dorsalis posterior; VT –
ventral (subpallial) telencephalon; DMv – dorsomedial ventralis.

The fish optic tectum (Figure 1A) is more involved in sensorimotor integration in
fishes than its homolog, the superior colliculus, is in mammals. All sensory modalities present
in any given teleost species, with the exception of olfaction, are represented in the tectum.
However, visual input is especially strong and the tectum is generally viewed as the primary
visual center in fishes (Feinberg and Mallatt 2013, 2016; Li 2016; Meek 1983). As such, the
tectum is crucial for the transformation of visual input into directed, adaptive global motor
3
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output. This transformation begins with the creation of an accurate point-by-point
representation of visual space on the retina. Feinberg and Mallatt (2016) refer to this
representation as sensory isomorphism. Retinal input to the tectum generates an isomorphic
neural representation of visual space. Feinberg and Mallatt take it as axiomatic “that mental
images are a part of primary, sensory consciousness and, therefore, contribute to “something
it is like to be.) The neural representation of the world in the tectum is experienced
subjectively as mental images. On my view, this is an important insight into what it means for
a neural system to participate in the generation of sentience.
2.1 Tectal Neuroanatomy
But what evidence is there that the optic tectum is a crucial part of such a neural
system? Others, in particular Feinberg and Mallatt (2013, 2016) and Merker (2007), have
provided extensive reviews of this evidence. I will not replicate these reviews, but will
provide a brief account of data indicating that the optic tectum, and its extrinsic and intrinsic
connections, meet the requirements to be an anatomical substrate of sentience in fishes. I will
discuss only the visual modality, but the basic organizational pattern also applies to the other
sensory modalities represented in the tectum.
One requirement is that the visual world be accurately represented in the tectum.
Isomorphic retinal input mediated by the excitatory neurotransmitter glutamate terminates
primarily in the uppermost of the six neuronal layers of the tectum on the opposite side of
the brain. Both anatomical and electrophysiological studies indicate that the pattern of
termination reflects the accurate point-by-point visual representation of the world created
on the retina (Nevin et al. 2010; Meek 1983; Venegas and Ito, 1983). Another requirement is
modulation of the primary sensory pathways by intrinsic excitatory and inhibitory
interneurons. Primary sensory input to the tectum can be amplified by positive feedforward
and feedback circuits created by excitatory glutaminergic interneurons. Intrinsic inhibitory
circuits created by interneurons that use γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA) as a transmitter
provide for temporal stabilization and spatial sharpening of activity within the excitatory
circuits (Kardamakisa et al. 2015; Nevin et al. 2010). One function of these inhibitory circuits
may be to improve discriminability of objects in the fish’s visual field. Ablation of these
neurons selectively impairs prey capture in zebrafish (Del Bene et al. 2010), possibly because
the prey is perceived as larger than it is and because predator avoidance rather than prey
approach behavior is selected (Barker and Baier 2015).
The tectum also receives input from mesencephalic and hindbrain nuclei, as well as
the diencephalic and telencephalic regions, including the pallium. As will be discussed below,
this input allows memory and emotion to influence tectal output to brainstem structures that
regulate motor programs. The output of the tectum arises from neurons located in its deeper
layers. This output terminates in the telencephalic, diencephalic, and brainstem sites that
provide input to the tectum, and, most importantly, in premotor brainstem nuclei that
directly control behavior. These nuclei send input back to the tectum, thereby providing rapid
feedback to refine future output (Kinoshita et al. 2006; Meek 1983; Nevin et al. 2010; Sato et
al. 2007).
In sum, the extrinsic reciprocal neuronal connections and the intrinsic neuroanatomy
of the teleost tectum are complex enough to support the reentrant computational processes
proposed to underlie sentience in mammals (Crick and Koch 2003; G. Edelman 1989; G.
4
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Edelman et al. 2011; Seth et al. 2005). In mammals, neural and behavioral markers of such
computational processes are associated with the neocortex and its connections to the
thalamus. If the conclusion reached above is correct, then it should be possible to find similar
markers associated with the tectum of fishes. Here I will provide a specific example.
2.2 Selective Attention and Tectal Neurophysiology
Feinberg and Mallat (2016) include “mechanisms for selective attention to stimuli” as
one of their criteria for sensory consciousness, the process that I am calling sentience.
Selective attention may be a legitimate criterion for the presence of sentience, but
researchers in this area do not agree as to how this may be. Sentience and selective attention
are generally not considered to be the same process, and evidence indicates that either can
be present without the other (Baars 1997; van Boxtel et al. 2010; Howe et al. 2009; Tononi
and Koch 2015). However, it seems undeniable that the two are related. I suggest that some
form of sentient pre-attentional awareness of the world exists as long as an adequate level of
arousal and general, nonspecific awareness of the environment are present. However, in the
absence of selective attention, the contents of sentience required to produce specific actions
necessary for survival, such as finding food or avoiding a predator, are absent. On this view,
then, selective attention varies the force and focus of sentience. The implication is that, if
sentience did not exist, then the processes of selective attention would have no work to do.
Therefore, they would not exist. But it is indisputable that they do. Thus, agreeing with
Feinberg and Mallatt, I argue that selective attention is a legitimate criterion for the presence
of sentience.
A principal function of selective attention in the visual modality is to guide visual
search for salient environmental items, whether these items are places of safety, a predator
or food. In primates, visual search for salient environmental targets is conducted in either a
parallel or serial mode (Itti and Koch 2001). The parallel mode guides attentional processes
when the target object is distinct from surrounding distractor objects. Reaction time for
detecting the target is very short in the parallel mode and is not lengthened by increasing the
number of distractor objects. In this mode, the target is said to “pop-out” from the background
distractors. Attentional processes are guided by the serial mode when the distractor items
are similar to the target item. Increasing the number of distractors increases reaction time
and no pop-out occurs. In primates, neocortical areas are associated with these search modes
and consequent action selection (Bichot and Schall 2002; Li 2016).
Ben-Tov et al. (2015) have demonstrated both parallel and serial visual search modes
in the archer fish and have found neural correlates of these processes in the optic tectum.
Archer fish are able to prey on insects by hitting them with water forced from their
specialized mouths. The insect is the salient object and the fish executes a visual search to
locate it. Ben-Tov et al. used small rectangular bars as targets and established that the
reaction time for archer fish to shoot a bar moving either faster than, or in the opposite
direction from, distractor bars did not change as the number of distractors increased from 4
to 8. That is, the fish demonstrated the pop-out effect characteristic of the parallel mode of
visual search. When the size of the bar was salient, reaction times for target selection
increased as the number of distractors increased, indicating that the serial mode was being
used.
5
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Ben-Tov et al. identified neural correlates of pop-out in the tectum of archer fish.
Discharge rates of tectal neurons correlated with characteristics of the selected target.
“Speed-contrast” neurons fired at higher than baseline rates only when the speed of the target
was salient while “direction-contrast” neurons fired at higher rates only when the target
direction was salient. They also found “both-contrast “neurons that increased their discharge
rates under either saliency condition.
Ben-Tov et al. also conducted an experiment in which the target was defined by a
combination of speed and direction. Compared to selection rates for a single target feature, a
target differentiated by both features was significantly more likely the be selected. When
neurophysiological responses were investigated, Ben-Tov et al. found that some of the
neurons that increased their firing rate to a single target increased the rate significantly more
in the presence of the additive target.
In sum, archer fishes use the same attentional modes used by primates to construct a
neural map of salient stimuli from a pre-attentional isomorphic neural map of the visual
world. Both the isomorphic and salient neural structures are located in the tectum. The maps
are dynamic and include neuronal circuits capable of associating two distinct characteristics
of a visual stimulus (speed and direction of movement) to effectively drive a behavioral
response. This capability may be interpreted as representing a simple form of sensory
binding.
2.3 Summary
Several criteria have been suggested for a brain structure to qualify as a substrate of
sentience (e.g., Crick and Koch 1990; 2003; G. Edelman 1989; Feinberg and Mallatt 2016; Seth
et al. 2005). Each of these is a criterion for sentience, not sentience itself. One criterion is
complexity of neural architecture and connectivity. The tectum meets this criterion. Two
other criteria are isomorphic representation of sensory input and segregation of the sensory
modalities. Isomorphic sensory maps are produced in the tectum. Additionally, the neural
representation of each sensory modality is segregated from the others within the tectum.
Another criterion is the presence of neural mechanisms for selective attention. The tectum
has these mechanisms. The ability to merge, or bind, sensory input into a coherent image
which can be used to direct motor output is also included. The additive effects of two distinct
characteristics of a visual stimulus suggest that the tectum has this capacity. From this
analysis, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the tectum is at least a part of the physical
substrate of sentience in fishes.
Critics of this hypothesis are likely to insist that sentience requires structures that are
homologous to the mammalian neocortex and thalamus and to maintain that the tectum and
its interconnections failed to meet this requirement (e.g., Key 2015, 2016a, b; Rose 2002,
2007; Rose et al. 2012). It is also likely that critics would explain the ability of archer fish to
discriminate between targets and distractors as some combination of reflex behavior and
implicit discrimination learning. I admit there is room for such an argument. However, an
explanation of the results of an experiment by Schuster et al. (2006) requires more than
invoking implicit discrimination learning.
Although moving targets are salient for archer fish, the ability to hit one reliably takes
practice. Schuster et al (2006) trained archer fish to reliably hit a target 60 cm above the
water traveling at 60 mm/s. As with the experiment by Ben-Tov et al. (2015), these results
6
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can be explained in behavioristic terms. However, the results of the second part of the
experiment by Schuster et al. does not admit of such a simple explanation. They found that a
second group of fishes, who only observed another fish hitting a moving target, were able to
hit the target with a high rate of accuracy on their first opportunity to do so. It is difficult to
explain this observation without reference to the ability of the observers to form and store in
memory a mental image of other fish successfully executing the task. This is an example of
declarative memory, which requires conscious awareness (Cohen et al. 1997; Eichenbaum
and Cohen 2014; Squire et al. 2015), and is, therefore, a marker for the presence of sentience.
The proposal that declarative memory is necessary for the ability of archer fish to
learn from observation leads to my second thesis that the pallium is a necessary component
of the neural substrate for sentience in fishes. In this I diverge somewhat from the theory
proposed by Feinberg and Mallatt (2016). Those authors do include a role in memory
processing for the pallium in their model but they do not grant the pallium any place in the
generation of mental images. Rather, the pallium simply modulates motor commands issued
by the tectum (Feinberg and Mallatt 2016, Kindle edition, location 2580). I argue below that
the pallium has a more central role in the formation of mental images — and, hence, in
sentience in fishes — than simple modulation of tectal processing.
3. SENTIENCE IN FISHES: PALLIAL ANATOMY
3.1 Overview of Sensory-Specific Connections
The teleost pallium receives a variety of modality-specific sensory inputs (Giassi et al.
2012b; Ito and Yamamoto 2009; Northcutt 2006; Yamamoto and Ito 2008). As in mammals,
all sensory modalities in fishes, other than olfaction, reach the pallium through a subpallial
relay. Unlike mammals, the primary sensory relay is not the thalamus. The thalamus does
contribute input to the teleost pallium (Echteler and Saidel 1981; Ito et al. 1986), but the
diencephalic preglomerular complex (PgC; Figure 1B) — a component of what Mueller
(2012) named the “wider thalamus” — is the principal source of its monosynaptic sensory
input (Demski 2013; Giassi et al. 2012b; Mueller 2012; Northcutt 2006; Yamamoto and Ito
2008). The PgC receives topographically organized input from the tectum (Giassi et al. 2012a;
Northcutt 2006) and its output to the pallium maintains modality segregation. Recognizing
this, Ito and Yamamoto (2009) concluded that: “Ascending pathways mediated by the
preglomerular complex enumerated above exhibit a considerable degree of modality-specific
organization similarly to mammalian thalamocortical pathways” (p. 117). For example, visual
input terminates most heavily in the dorsal lateral pallium (DLd/DLv in Figure 1). Indeed, the
DLd has been proposed as the visual pallium for many teleosts (Demski 2013; Saidel et al.
2001). Cell clusters in different parts of the DM receive auditory, gustatory, and lateral line
input (Demski 2013; Northcutt 2006; Prechtl et al. 2008). In some species, the DD receives
some sensory input, but its major connections are with the other pallial divisions.
The DC receives comparatively little subpallial input but has reciprocal connections
with other pallial divisions and is the major source of pallial output to the tectum, the PgC,
and numerous other subpallial sensory-motor structures (Echteler and Saidel 1981; Giassi et
al. 2011; Giassi et al. 2012b, c; Ito et al. 1986; Murakami et al. 1983). Therefore, the large
neurons in the DC can affect motor programs or modulate sensory input to other pallial
7
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divisions through its connections to the diencephalic and midbrain motor and sensory
processing sites.
3.2 Non-Specific, Modulatory Pallial Inputs
In addition to the qualities associated with sensory input from the environment,
sentience includes subjective feelings associated with motivational and affective states such
as hunger, thirst and fear. These states are supported not by sensory-specific input from
subcortical structures, but by subcortical input that terminates throughout the cortex (Purvis
et al. 2011). In mammals, these systems are associated with the cholinergic, dopaminergic,
GABAergic, serotonergic, and noradrenergic neurotransmitter systems. The same
neurotransmitter systems are found in fishes (Echteler and Saidel 1981; Giassi et al. 2012b,
c; Giraldez-Perez et al. 2013; Mueller and Guo 2009; Murakami et al. 1983; Schweitzer et al.
2012). The presence of dopaminergic and serotonergic input suggests that motivational and
affectual systems found in mammals also exist in fishes. These neurotransmitters are
involved in guiding approach and avoidance behaviors (e.g., Dayan 2012). Feinberg and
Mallatt (2016) rightly include the feeling states associated with these behaviors in what they
call sensory consciousness and what I am calling sentience. The existence of these
neurotransmitter systems in fishes provides additional support for sentience in teleosts.
Additionally, cholinergic, noradrenergic and serotonergic afferents to the cortex affect
memory, attentional processes, and states of consciousness (e.g., awake or asleep, dream
sleep or non-dream sleep) in mammals (Richerson et al. 2012). The presence of widespread
input containing these neurotransmitters from subpallial structures, particularly the
midbrain and hypothalamus, to the pallium suggests the existence of common modulatory
mechanisms for these functions in fishes and mammals.
3.3 Excitatory and Inhibitory Connections of the Pallial Divisions
Research from Leonard Maler’s laboratory at the University of Ottawa (Elliot et al.,
2017; Giassi et al. 2012 a, b, c; Trinh et al. 2015) exploring the pallium of two species of weakly
electric knifefish has confirmed the gross pattern of intrapallial connections observed in
other teleost species (Echteler and Saidel 1981; Ito and Yamamoto, 2009; Northcutt, 2006),
and has added important details. Excitatory neurons are required for positive feedforward
and feedback control of local circuits. Inhibitory neurons are necessary for temporal
stabilization and spatial sharpening of activity within these circuits.
Using immunocytochemical markers and localized injections of neurotracers, Giassi
et al. (2012b, c) described the circuitry created by excitatory glutaminergic neurons. The DL
has reciprocal excitatory connections to the DD, thus permitting feedforward/feedback
excitation between the DL and DD. The DC receives excitatory glutaminergic input from the
DL. Similar to what has been found in other species, the knifefish DC is the principal source
of excitatory pallial output to diencephalic, midbrain and hindbrain targets, each of which
returns excitatory input to the DL. These three regions of the fish pallium therefor have
circuits that can support reentrant processing, one of the proposed requirements for a
neurobiological substrate of sentience (e.g., Crick and Koch 2003; G. Edelman 1989; G.
Edelman et al. 2011).
8
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Mueller and Guo (2009) observed presumptive inhibitory GABAergic neurons in the
DL, DD, DM and DC in zebrafish. Giassi et al. (2012a, c) confirmed this observation in knifefish.
Giassi et al. (2012c) also observed rich intrinsic GABAergic plexuses and numerous
GABAergic terminals, particularly in the DL. The source of some of this GABAergic
innervation is the telencephalic subpallium (Elliot et al. 2017; Giassi et al. 2012c; VT in Figure
1B) which, in turn, receives excitatory glutaminergic input from the DM (Gaissi et al. 2012b,
c). Whether the source is intrinsic or extrinsic, GABAergic terminals within the DL, DM and
DD modulate the activity of excitatory glutaminergic neurons (R. Vargas et al. 2012).
3.4 Pallial Layers and Cryptic Columns in the DL
Giassi et al. (2012c) investigated the extrinsic connections of the DL and the other
pallial divisions of the knifefish. In order to study the intrinsic connections of the DL, Trinh et
al. (2015) incubated slices of the pallia from knifefish in nutritive media. They located the DL
in the slice and used a microscope to guide injections of axonal tracers into discrete parts of
it. Analysis of the resulting data indicated that the trajectory of the intrinsic axons arising
from some of the large neurons within the DL separate it into 60-µm-thick lamina along its
horizontal axis. Axons from other large neurons have projections extending 100 to 150 µm.
These projections delineate columns along the vertical axis. Each column connects
reciprocally to adjacent columns creating local recurrent networks throughout the DL. Thus,
the DL of the knifefish pallium exhibits both a layered and a columnar organization.
Such a neuronal organization is characteristic of the mammalian cortex, but Trinh et
al. (2015) emphasize that the columns observed in knifefish are not structurally discrete in
the same way as columns in regions of the mammalian neocortex, such as the somatosensory
cortex. Rather, they resemble the overlapping cryptic ocular dominance columns found in the
visual cortex (e.g., Kaskan et al. 2007). Cryptic columnar organization allows small changes
in input to one column to cause a slight shift in neuronal activity in overlapping columns,
thereby allowing spatiotemporal integration of sensory input and binding.
3.5 Fish Pallial Anatomy: Summary
The research reviewed above indicates that the fish pallium has reciprocal
connections with subcortical structures that provide it with both specific sensory and nonspecific modulatory input. The specific sensory input to the pallium arises primarily from the
PgC and is analogous to the reentrant network between the thalamus and cortex in mammals
which has been proposed to correlate with conscious experience of environmental stimuli.
The non-specific input comes from ventral telencephalic, diencephalic and brainstem nuclei,
and contains neurotransmitters associated with affective and motivational states in
mammals. My conclusion is that the teleost pallium has the neuroanatomical complexity
necessary to contribute to sentience. In the next section, I will give evidence that the pallium
also exhibits neurophysiological markers of sentience.

9
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4. SENTIENCE IN FISHES: PALLIAL NEUROPHYSIOLOGY
4.1 Pallial Rhythmic Electrical Activity
There are few relevant neurophysiological experiments, and they were not specifically
designed to evaluate the pallium for correlates of sentience. However, their results suggest
the fish pallium exhibits generalized electrophysiological responses correlated with several
criteria of sentience in mammals. For example, recordings of the electroencephalograms
from the skulls of Atlantic salmon (E. Lambooji et al., 2010), African catfish (E. Lambooji et al.
2006) and the turbot (B. Lambooji et al. 2015) demonstrated that the pallium of the fish
generates electrical activity in the delta (0.5–4 Hz), theta (4-8 Hz), alpha (8–14 Hz), beta
(14–30 Hz) and gamma (30 Hz and higher) bandwidths. The same spectrum of EEG
frequencies is generated by the mammalian cortex and correlates with levels of arousal and,
at the gamma frequency, with attentional processes and possibly with sensory binding.
(Baars et al. 2013; Crick and Koch 1990; 2003; Edelman 2003; Orpwood 2013; Tononi and
Edelman 1998). In addition to generalized electrophysiological responses similar to those
found in the mammalian cortex, the teleost pallium shows modality-specific, sense-evoked
responses (Prechtl et al. 2008; Elliot and Maier 2015).
4.2 Sensory-Evoked Activity
Prechtl et al. (1998) recorded evoked action potentials from the pallial neurons of
weakly electric elephant nose fish in response to auditory, visual, mechanical (water
movement), lateral line and electrical field stimulation. The electrical field stimulation was
not noxious, but intended to mimic stimulation produced by the fish itself, or by conspecifics.
In accord with the anatomical data described above, responses to visual stimuli were
observed predominantly in the lateral pallium. Responses to electrical stimuli also occurred
more laterally in the pallium, but were clustered toward its posterior (toward the tail) pole.
Mechanical-stimuli-evoked responses mostly from neurons located ventromedial to the area
where responses to electrical stimuli predominated and auditory-evoked responses were
predominantly found in the anterior medial pallium. It is interesting that Prechtl et al. also
observed that the sensory stimuli used in their study produced field potentials that oscillated
in bandwidths from 15 to 55 Hz. The higher end of these bandwidths corresponds to the
gamma frequency proposed, as noted previously, to be the neurobiological signature of
attentional processes and sensory binding.
I indicated above that the primary interconnectivity of the DD is with other pallial
divisions. Using electric brown ghost knifefish, Elliot and Maler (2015) made extracellular
and patch-clamp recordings from DD neurons in response to electrosensory or acoustic
stimulation. Extracellular recording revealed that DD neurons exhibited sustained discharge
to electrosensory stimulation. It is interesting that the onset latency for DD neurons to
respond to electrosensory stimulation was substantially longer than that found for medial
pallial neurons to respond in the study by Prechtl et al. (1998). This finding is compatible
with the anatomical data that indicate the DD does not receive significant direct sensory
input, but adds further processing to sensory input to the DL and DM. Patch-clamp recordings
indicated that the membrane potential for DD neurons went from the persistent “down” state
of approximately -70 mV to an “up” state of approximately -45 mV in response to
10
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electrosensory stimulation. The shift to a smaller negative membrane voltage indicates an
increase in neuronal excitability, and these responses correlated with the frequency of
extracellular spiking. Acoustic stimulation produced similar effects. In interpreting these
results, Elliot and Maler (2015) hypothesized that “Up states are induced by complex and
variable pallial network activity that intervenes between sensory input and DD cells” (p.
2075). The results of this experiment suggest that the DD may be involved in longer-term
cognitive processing of input to other pallial divisions and can be taken as support for the
proposal that the DD serves as an association region, thereby expanding the regional
complexity of the pallium.
4.3 Fish Pallial Neurophysiology: Summary
Neurophysiological studies show that neurons in the fish pallium generate the same
spectrum of EEG frequencies and waveforms observed in mammals. Pallial neurons also
respond to sensory stimulation with specific evoked responses that show some segregation
by sensory modality. Sensory stimulation also evokes EEG activity in the gamma bandwidth,
a presumed correlate of attentional processes and sensory binding. Additionally,
electrophysiological data support the hypothesis, generated from anatomical data, that a part
of the pallium, the DD, possibly serves an associative function. These electrophysiological
data are consistent with the hypothesis that the fish pallium contributes to the production of
sentience in fishes.
5. THE PALLIUM AND BEHAVIORAL MARKERS OF SENTIENCE
The purpose of this section is to discuss experiments that link behavior of fishes to
both the pallium and sentience. I will not discuss the substantial body of behavioral research
that is supportive of my thesis that fishes are sentient because most of it was not designed to
evaluate the role of the pallium in behavior. Additionally, much of it has been reviewed in
recent publications (Allen 2013; Balcombe 2016; Braithwaite 2010; Brown 2014, 2016;
Brown et al. 2011; Sneddon 2015).
Two general categories of behavior have dominated the published literature
concerned with the behavioral functions of the fish pallium. The reason for this dominance
stems from the anatomical, developmental, and molecular research that points to the medial
pallium (DM – DMd and DMv in Figure 1B) of fishes as a homolog to the mammalian
amygdala, and to the lateral pallium (DL – DLd/DLv) as a homolog to the mammalian
hippocampus (Ganz et al. 2015; Harvey-Girard et al. 2012; Nieuwenhuys and Meek 1990;
Northcutt 2006). These homologies led to the hypothesis that lesions of the DM or DL would
have the same behavioral effects as lesions of the amygdala or hippocampus in mammals.
Research generated primarily by researchers at the Universidad de Sevilla has largely
supported this hypothesis (Portovella et al 2004a, b; Vargas et al. 2006; 2012).
5.1 Avoidance Behavior and the Pallium
As indicated earlier, I follow Allen and Trestman (2016) and define sentience broadly
as the ability to have any subjective experience. This definition differs from that of Feinberg
and Mallatt (2016) who regard sentience as the affective component of sensory
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consciousness. Despite this definitional disagreement, I agree with their requirement that
“for an animal to be ‘sentient’ it must be capable of experiencing an affective state” (Feinberg
and Mallatt 2016, Kindle location 3055).
Lesions of the DM impair learned behaviors motivated by aversive stimuli in the same
way that destruction of the amygdala does in mammals (Davis 1992). For example, Portavella
et al. (2004a, b) assessed the effects of either DM or DL lesions on the ability of goldfish to
learn a shuttle-box avoidance task. A shuttle box has two compartments. The fish had to learn
to swim from one box to the other in response to presentation of a colored light (the
conditioned stimulus, CS) in order to avoid electrical shock (the unconditioned stimulus, US).
Portavella et al. found that DM lesions had no effect on escape from electrical shock, but
significantly impaired learning of the avoidance response to the CS. DL lesions had no effect.
These results support the hypotheses that integrity of the DM is necessary for
successful performance of a learned, aversively-motivated behavior and that it is a homolog
of the amygdala. However, whether sentience is required to explain the acquisition of shuttlebox avoidance can be questioned. The answer to this question depends on interpretation of
the two-process theory usually used to explain shuttle-box avoidance learning (Mowrer
1960). The first process is classical conditioning. The CS produces a conditioned emotional
response after repeated association with the innate aversive emotional response produced
by the US. The second process is operant conditioning. On one interpretation, the innate and
conditioned emotional responses are equated to experience of fear. Reinforcement occurs
when the avoidance response reduces fear (Mowrer 1960). Several publications describing a
variety of other procedures to assess avoidance behavior in intact members of several species
of fish support this view (e.g., Braithwaite 2010; Braithwaite and Boulcott 2007). If fear is
considered to be a consciously experienced state, then the ability of fishes to learn shuttlebox avoidance supports the hypothesis that they are sentient. Under this interpretation, the
DM is part of a distributed neural system that generates the feeling of fear. Subpallial
structures comprise the core of this system, and, in conjunction with the DM, participate in
elaboration of the negative affectual component of sentience in fishes.
5.2 Declarative Memory and the Pallium
Declarative memory in humans and other mammals is associated with availability for
conscious recollection and provides flexible guidance to behavior in different contexts.
Behaviors that require relational learning among stimuli distributed either over time or in
space are considered to be exemplars of declarative memory. Transitive inference (TI)
provides an excellent example (Cohen et al. 1997; Eichenbaum and Cohen 2014). TI is the
ability to infer a relationship between items that have not been previously directly compared.
First observing that A<B, B<C, and C<D, and then deducing that A<D is an example of TI. In
humans TI requires conscious awareness of the relationships (Smith and Squire 2005). Thus,
the presence of TI in a non-human species can be taken as an indication that the species is
sentient.
Grosenick et al. (2007) demonstrated that male cichlid fish (Astatotiliapia burtoni)
exhibit TI in an observational learning situation. Male A. burtoni inevitably fight for territory.
A bystander male (BM) was placed in the center of an arena surrounded by five small
compartments (A through E) with transparent walls. Each compartment housed a combatant
fish (CF). CF B was introduced into CF A’s compartment, then CF C into CF B’s, and so on. Each
12
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invader lost the ensuing fight. For example, CF A beat CF B and CF D beat CF E. CF A and CF E
were then placed in separate transparent chambers and the time the BM spent near each fish
was recorded. This was repeated for CF B and CF D. Although CF A had not fought with CF E,
nor CF B with CF D, the BMs consistently spent more time in the vicinity of the losers (B and
E) than they did in the vicinity of winners. This is a clear indication of TI and supports the
hypothesis that fish are sentient.
Destruction of the hippocampus significantly impairs behaviors associated with
declarative memory (Eichenbaum and Cohen 2014; Squire et al. 2015) including TI (Smith
and Squire 2005). Because the DL of fishes is considered to be the homolog of the
hippocampus, lesions of the DL should disrupt behaviors associated with declarative memory
in fishes. The effects of DL lesions on TI in fishes have not been demonstrated, although it is
a testable hypothesis that DL lesions would impair TI in archer fishes. However, other
behaviors requiring relational learning have been identified in fishes (Gerlai 2017), and the
effect of DL lesions on some of these has been demonstrated.
Declarative memory is distinguished from procedural or implicit memory which is
unconscious and is characterized by inflexible stimulus response associations. Classical
conditioning is regarded as a characteristic example of procedural memory. It is dependent
upon the integrity of the cerebellum regardless of the temporal relationship between the CS
and the US (Christian and Thompson 2003). The hippocampus is not required for procedural
memory, including classical conditioning, except under a specific experimental design known
as “trace” conditioning. In the trace procedure, the US is turned on at some time after the CS
been turned off. Thus, the term “trace” refers to the assumption that there must be some trace
of the CS remaining to relate it to the US across the temporal gap between the offset of the CS
and the onset of the US. This procedure differs from the “delay” procedure in which the US
comes on while the CS is still present. Hippocampal destruction in humans and other
mammals has no effect on conditioning in the delay procedure (Christian and Thompson
2003). Nor does destruction of the DL in the goldfish impair classical conditioning when the
delay procedure is used (Gómez et al. 2016; Rodríguez-Expósito et al. 2017).
However, hippocampal destruction does impair acquisition of classical conditioning
when the trace procedure is employed in both mammals (Weiss et al. 2015) and goldfish
(Gómez et al. 2016; Rodríguez-Expósito 2017). These results do not mean that the cerebellum
is not important in trace conditioning, as cerebellar destruction impairs trace conditioning in
both mammals and fish. They are, however, interpreted to indicate that the hippocampus (or
DL in fishes) functions in concert with the cerebellum in trace conditioning to enable
declarative memory — and thus conscious awareness — to form a conscious image from
memory to relate the CS and US across the temporal gap.
The same effect has been reported for shuttle-box avoidance learning by Portavella et
al. (2004a). As described above, while DM lesions impaired shuttle-box avoidance learning,
DL lesions had no effect when the delay procedure was used. However, when a trace
procedure in which there was a five-second delay between the offset of the CS in the onset of
the US was used, both DM and DL lesions impaired shuttle-box avoidance learning. These
results are compatible with research in humans indicating that trace conditioning involves
conscious awareness (Clark and Squire 1998) and hence give some support to the hypothesis
that fish are sentient.
In addition to TI, Eichenbaum (2000) considers allocentric spatial learning to be a
clear indication of the presence of declarative memory in animals. Allocentric spatial learning
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refers to the ability of a person or animal to encode and organize the memory system for
spatial information based on the physical relationships of objects as part of a distant scene
independent of the subject’s position relative to those objects. A large number of teleost
species demonstrate allocentric spatial learning (e.g., Brown 2014; Durán et al. 2010; Creson
et al. 2003; White and Brown 2015). The mammalian hippocampus is associated with
allocentric spatial processing (Nadel 1991). The following evidence indicates that the DL is
associated with spatial learning in fish.
Hippocampal neurons in rats show place-related increases in the firing rate, and
hippocampal lesions impair allocentric spatial learning in rats (Nadel 1991). DL neurons in
freely swimming goldfish and cichlid fish show place-related increases in the firing rate
(Canfield and Mizumori 2004), and Uceda et al. (2015) observed spatial-learning-related
increases in metabolic activity in the goldfish ventral DLv. Furthermore, a series of
experiments from the Seville group indicate that lesions of the entire DL (e.g., Durán et al.
2010; J. Vargas et al. 2006), or just to the DLv (Bingman et al. 2017), impair allocentric spatial
learning in goldfish. DM lesions, on the other hand, have no effect on allocentric spatial
learning (Durán et al. 2010; J. Vargas et al. 2006).
5.3 The Pallium and Behavior: Summary
In this section I have described the results of experiments which indicate a double
dissociation between the behavioral effects of DM and DL lesions. DL lesions impair behavior
only when the task demands that a relationship among stimuli be maintained across time or
in space. I argue that this implicates the DL in declarative memory which by general
consensus implies conscious awareness. DM lesions, on the other hand, impair behaviors
generally associated with procedural memory which does not require conscious awareness.
However, even here, the DM may be involved in the affective component of sentience if the
two-process theory of shuttle-box learning is interpreted to involve a subjective sense of fear.
Particularly for the DM, the function of these pallial structures in the modulation of behavior
is part of a network that includes core subpallial structures. However, I argue that the DL
plays an important role in the generation of mental images, and thereby sentience, when
declarative memory is required for successful execution of motor programs that are
organized in brainstem structures.
6. CONCLUSION
In this target article, I have argued that fish are sentient. As indicated above, this
argument has been cogently made by others based on the complexity of brainstem circuitry
(e.g., Feinberg and Mallatt 2013, 2016; Merker 2007), and the flexibility and complexity of
the behavior of fishes (e.g., Balcombe 2016; Braithwaite 2010; Brown 2014; Brown et al.
2011). I have also argued that the intrinsic neuroanatomical organization and extrinsic
connections of the pallium, particularly with the PgC and the tectum, are complex enough to
be at least weakly analogous to the circuitry of the cortex and thalamus assumed by some to
underlie sentience in mammals. Neurophysiological and behavioral data further support the
hypothesis that fish have the capacity for sentience.
Based on the evidence reviewed in this paper, I suggest that the pallium is an
important part of the hierarchical network proposed by Feinberg and Mallatt (2016) to
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underlie sentience in fishes. The tectum is at the core of this network. The tectum receives
segregated sensory input and has the local and global reentrant neural circuitry needed to
amplify and process this input. Segregation of the sensory modalities is maintained through
the PgC to the pallium. The pallium also receives input from subpallial structures involved in
placing a positive or negative valence on this input. These inputs are then integrated by
various divisions of the pallium. Particularly in the case of the DL and declarative memory,
the result of this integration is the formation of mental images that permit relational
interactions among stimuli and flexible regulation of behaviors organized in the brainstem.
In her book Animal Minds, Andrews (2015) makes the point that, “Members of the
human species have human minds, and if members of other species have minds, they will
have species-specific minds of their own” (p. 4). It is safe to say the same about those
processes of the mind of fishes I call sentience. Fish sentience differs from human sentience,
and what it feels like is as unknowable to us as what it feels like to be a bat. However, just as
Nagel (1974) found it reasonable for there to be something it feels like to be a bat, I think that
it is reasonable to adduce from the existing evidence that there is something it feels like to be
a fish.
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Call for Commentary: Animal Sentience publishes Open Peer Commentary on all accepted target
articles. Target articles are peer-reviewed. Commentaries are editorially reviewed. There are
submitted commentaries as well as invited commentaries. Commentaries appear as soon as they
have been reviewed, revised and accepted. Target article authors may respond to their
commentaries individually or in a joint response to multiple commentaries.
Instructions: http://animalstudiesrepository.org/animsent/guidelines.html
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The Other Minds Problem: Animal Sentience and Cognition
Overview. Since Descartes, philosophers know there is no way to know for sure what — or whether — others feel
(not even if they tell you). Science, however, is not about certainty but about probability and evidence. The 7.5
billion individual members of the human species can tell us what they are feeling. But there are 9 million other
species on the planet (20 quintillion individuals), from elephants to jellyfish, with which humans share biological and
cognitive ancestry, but not one other species can speak: Which of them can feel — and what do they feel? Their
human spokespersons — the comparative psychologists, ethologists, evolutionists, and cognitive neurobiologists
who are the world’s leading experts in “mind-reading" other species -- will provide a sweeping panorama of what it
feels like to be an elephant, ape, whale, cow, pig, dog, bat, chicken, fish, lizard, lobster, snail: This growing body of
facts about nonhuman sentience has profound implications not only for our understanding of human cognition, but
for our treatment of other sentient species.
Gregory Berns: Decoding the Dog's Mind with Awake
Neuroimaging
Gordon Burghardt: Probing the Umwelt of Reptiles
Jon Sakata: Audience Effects on Communication
Signals
PANEL 1: Reptiles, Birds and Mammals
WORKSHOP 1: Kristin Andrews: The "Other"
Problems: Mind, Behavior, and Agency9
Sarah Brosnan: How Do Primates Feel About Their
Social Partners?
Alexander Ophir: The Cognitive Ecology of
Monogamy
Michael Hendricks: Integrating Action and Perception
in a Small Nervous System
PANEL 2: Primates, Voles and Worms
WORKSHOP 2: Jonathan Birch: Animal Sentience
and the Precautionary Principle
Malcolm MacIver: How Sentience Changed After Fish
Invaded Land 385 Million Years Ago
Sarah Woolley: Neural Mechanisms of Preference in
Female Songbird
Simon Reader: Animal Social Learning: Implications
for Understanding Others
PANEL 3: Sea to Land to Air
WORKSHOP 3: Steven M. Wise: Nonhuman
Personhood
Tomoko Ohyama: Action Selection in a Small Brain
(Drosophila Maggot)
Mike Ryan: "Crazy Love": Nonlinearity and
Irrationality in Mate Choice
Louis Lefebvre: Animal Innovation: From Ecology to
Neurotransmitters
PANEL 4: Maggots, Frogs and Birds: Flexibility
Evolving
SPECIAL EVENT: Mario Cyr: Polar Bears
Colin Chapman: Why Do We Want to Think People
Are Different?
Vladimir Pradosudov: Chickadee Spatial Cognition
Jonathan Balcombe: The Sentient World of Fishes
PANEL 5: Like-Mindedness and Unlike-Mindedness
WORKSHOP 5 (part 1): Gary Comstock: A Cow's
Concept of Her Future

WORKSHOP 5 (part 2): Jean-Jacques Kona-Boun:
Physical and Mental Risks to Cattle and Horses in
Rodeos
Joshua Plotnik: Thoughtful Trunks: Application of
Elephant Cognition for Elephant Conservation
Lori Marino: Who Are Dolphins?
PANEL 6: Mammals All, Great and Small
Larry Young: The Neurobiology of Social Bonding,
Empathy and Social Loss in Monogamous Voles
WORKSHOP 6: Lori Marino: The Inconvenient Truth
About Thinking Chickens
Andrew Adamatzky: Slime Mould: Cognition Through
Computation
Frantisek Baluska & Stefano Mancuso: What a Plant
Knows and Perceives
Arthur Reber: A Novel Theory of the Origin of Mind:
Conversations With a Caterpillar and a Bacterium
PANEL 7: Microbes, Molds and Plants
WORKSHOP 7: Suzanne Held & Michael Mendl: Pig
Cognition and Why It Matters
James Simmons: What Is It Like To Be A Bat?
Debbie Kelly: Spatial Cognition in Food-Storing
Steve Phelps: Social Cognition Across Species
PANEL 8: Social Space
WORKSHOP 8: To be announced
Lars Chittka: The Mind of the Bee
Reuven Dukas: Insect Emotions: Mechanisms and
Evolutionary Biology
Adam Shriver: Do Human Lesion Studies Tell Us the
Cortex is Required for Pain Experiences?
PANEL 9: The Invertebrate Mind
WORKSHOP 9: Delcianna Winders: Nonhuman
Animals in Sport and Entertainment
Carel ten Cate: Avian Capacity for Categorization and
Abstraction
Jennifer Mather: Do Squid Have a Sense of Self?
Steve Chang: Neurobiology of Monkeys Thinking
About Other Monkeys
PANEL 10: Others in Mind
WORKSHOP 10: The Legal Status of Sentient
Nonhuman Species

